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NOTES
Let the Agent Beware: Wilkinson v. Sweeny and
Undisclosed Corporate Status
Introduction
Applying the doctrine of undisclosed agency, the third circuit in
Wilkinson v. Sweeney' held the president of a closely held corporation
personally liable for a corporate debt due to his failure to adequately
disclose the corporate status of his business. Notwithstanding the pro-
priety of the use of the undisclosed agency doctrine in Louisiana, 2 this
© Copyright 1990, by LOUISINA LAW REvtaw.
1. 532 So. 2d 243 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 534 So. 2d 447 (1988).
2. Louisiana Civil Code articles 3012 and 3013 were cited as authority for undisclosed
agency in Louisiana by the Wilkinson court. This is consistent with prior jurisprudence.
The articles read literally, however, do not speak of undisclosed agency. The articles do
speak of the liability of a mandatary when he has acted beyond the scope of his authority.
La. Civ. Code art. 3012 provides: "The mandatary, who has communicated his authority
to a person with whom he contracts in that capacity, is not answerable to the latter for
anything done beyond it, unless he has entered into a personal guarantee." The article
may, however, by negative implication state that when the authority is not communicated,
the mandatary will be answerable. This interpretation may be going beyond the scope of
the article because its title, "Acts beyond power with third person informed of authority,"
may indicate that its emphasis is on actions done beyond the scope of the mandatary's
authority, and the subsequent liability when the agent did not inform the third person
about the limit of his authority. La. Civ. Code art. 3013 provides: "The mandatary is
responsible to those with whom he contracts, only when he has bound himself personally,
or when he has exceeded his authority without having exhibited his powers." Again, the
literal reading of the article discusses the mandatary's liability when he acts beyond the
scope of his authority. Regardless of this exercise in statutory interpretation, undisclosed
agency has been jurisprudentially accepted. In Chappuis & Chappuis v. Kaplan, 170 La.
763, 129 So. 156 (1930), the supreme court held that one acting for an undisclosed
principal is personally liable. And in Sentell v. Richardson, 211 La. 288, 29 So. 2d 852
(1947),. the court again used an undisclosed agency analysis in rendering its decision. In
Sentell, La. Civ. Code art. 2985 was at issue. Article 2985 provides that a mandate is
an act by which 'one gives another the power io transact for him and in his name. The
"in his name" language should preclude the application of the undisclosed agency doctrine.
The court realized this and reasoned that if this language was essential, there would be
no undisclosed agency. It was concluded that the language was not essential and it was
ignored.
For an example of a decision that acknowledged that undisclosed agency is not
recognized by the Civil Code, see Teachers' Retirement Sys. v. La. State Employees
Retirement Sys., 444 So. 2d 193, 196 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds,
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decision rested on questionable statutory authority. Although many issues
were raised in this case, the scope of this note will be limited to a
discussion of the duty incumbent on an agent to disclose his represen-
tative capacity, and more importantly, the standard by which his actions
will be judged by the courts. Whether or not this case is an isolated
incident remains to be seen, but as it now stands, it is a decision that
should concern agents, shareholders, and officers who transact business
for their corporation.
Facts of Wilkinson v. Sweeny
Sweeny, shareholder and president of Suntans Unlimited, Inc., en-
tered into negotiations with Wilkinson concerning the lease of office
space for a new business that Sweeny was in the process of starting.
Sweeny testified at trial that he had disclosed the corporate status of
the business to Wilkinson and that he had introduced his wife to
Wilkinson as the secretary of the corporation. Sweeny also introduced
other business associates as officers. The vice-president of Suntans Un-
limited testified that he was introduced to Wilkinson as such; however,
he could not recall if the status of the business was discussed at that
time. Prior to signing the lease, Sweeny gave Wilkinson a security deposit
drawn on the checking account of "Suntans Unlimited, Inc."
Four days after the security deposit was given, Sweeny executed the
lease, but the signature line for Suntans Unlimited did not include a
reference to its corporate status. During the lease period, checks drawn
on the account of "Suntans Unlimited, Inc." were paid monthly to
Wilkinson. Almost a year after the execution of the lease, Suntans
Unlimited declared bankruptcy and Wilkinson filed suit against Sweeny'
for the unpaid corporate debts totalling $874.81. Sweeny defended the
suit arguing that the corporation alone should be liable for the debt.
Wilkinson alleged that Suntans Unlimited's status as a corporation was
not disclosed, and Sweeny, acting as agent, should be held personally
liable.
The trial court denied Wilkinson's claim and he appealed. The court
of appeal reversed, holding Sweeny liable for the debts of Suntans
Unlimited. The court stated that Sweeny had an affirmative duty to
disclose his agency status so as to put Wilkinson on notice that he was
dealing with a corporation, and he failed to prove that he had satisfied
this duty.
456 So. 2d 594 (1984) (reversal based on procedural error). See also Comment, Juridical
Basis of Principal-Third Party Liability in Louisiana Undisclosed Agency Cases, 8 La.
L. Rev. 409 (1948) for a discussion of French law as it relates to the liability between
the principal and third party. For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that the
doctrine of undisclosed agency is properly applied in Louisiana.
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Preliminary Analysis of Decision
The doctrine of undisclosed agency mandates that to avoid personal
liability the agent must (1) disclose that he is an agent, and (2) disclose
the identity of his principal.' As one might expect, the inquiry into the
adequacy of disclosure of corporate status is often fact intensive.
In Wilkinson, the facts suggest that there was disclosure of both
the agency relationship as well as the identity of the principal. The
signature line on the lease was written "Suntans Unlimited, By: .... '"
This signature could easily have been interpreted as disclosure of both
the identity of the principal and the representative capacity of the agent.
The existence of Suntans Unlimited was disclosed, and the signature
indicated that Sweeny signed on behalf of the business. Furthermore,
there was no space for Sweeny to sign in an individual capacity. These
facts were held insufficient, however, because there was no "Inc." after
the name of the company, which would have indicated on the lease
agreement that Suntans Unlimited was a corporation.
The third circuit's application of the undisclosed agency doctrine to
determine the adequacy of disclosure of corporate status in Wilkinson
was not a novel use of the doctrine. In many Louisiana cases, the
adequacy of disclosure issue often turns on disclosure of corporate status
rather than disclosure of representative capacity or identity of principal.
The facts of the case may give the appearance that the agent did disclose
his agency status and the principal's identity, but the agent was nev-
ertheless held personally liable because of a seemingly insignificant failure
to expressly mention the corporate status.
One reason for such a result may be a policy based on equity. A
court may be faced with a situation where one party clearly benefits at
another party's expense. Instead of allowing the party to hide behind
his corporate shield, the court imposes liability on the agent. The un-
disclosed agency doctrine provides an alternative that allows a court to
circumvent the problems associated with "piercing the corporate veil,"
while at the same time shifting the loss to the party who benefited from
the contract. Whether or not this should be a proper application of the
doctrine is debatable, but it may explain a tendency exhibited by some
courts in holding that satisfactory disclosure has not beer; made.
Statutory Authority Cited in the Decision
The relevant statutory authority cited in the decision was Louisiana
Revised Statutes 12:23(A),' which provides in part, "The corporate name
3. Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 320-322 (1958); Wilkinson, 532 So. 2d at
245; 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 325 (1986).
4. Wilkinson, 532 So. 2d at 244.
5. Aside from the Civil Code articles previously mentioned, the court cited provisions
1990] 1185
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... shall contain the word 'Corporation', 'Incorporated' or 'Limited',
or the abbreviation of any of those words." Although the statute requires
that the business name include the reference to corporate status, this
section of Title 12 pertains to the filing requirements of a corporation,
not to the use of trade names. The court's discussion of this statute
was primarily concerned with a sign in front of the business which did
not contain any indication of the corporate status of Suntans Unlimited,
Inc. Presumably, the court used the statute to bolster its decision;
however, the statute neither applies to the facts of the case, nor is it
relevant since the business did not occupy the space when the parties
executed the lease.
If the court's reliance on Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:23(A) was
well-founded, then the use of a trade name without a reference to
corporate status would create per se exposure to personal liability for
employees of businesses that operate solely under a trade name. Using
the court's questionable reasoning, if sales clerks in stores do not disclose
the corporate status of the business, they may be held personally liable
if the sign in front of the store does not contain a reference to its
corporate identity. Such a result is highly undesirable and was probably
not contemplated by the court in rendering its decision.
The Agent's Duty of Disclosure
As has been stated, to avoid personal liability an agent must disclose
that he is acting as an agent and disclose the identity of his principal.
If the principal is a corporation, the agent must disclose the corporate
status of the principal. The use of an undisclosed agency analysis in
situations involving disclosure of corporate status is common in Louisiana
courts.
The agent's duty is not discharged by merely using a trade name.6
Even if the trade name is clearly distinguishable from that of the agent,
the use of the trade name without further indication of corporate status
is not sufficient to discharge the agent's duty of disclosure. 7 If one were
to use the rationale of Wilkinson and its reliance on the language of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:23(A), the agent would have to use one
from Title 12. The provisions La. R.S. 12:23(A), discussed in the text, and La. R.S.
12:82-12:95 were cited. The section covered under La. R.S. 12:82 has nothing to do with
the issue of disclosure of agency status. It pertains to the authorization of agents and
officers as described in the by-laws of the corporation. La. R.S. 12:23(A) provides: "The
corporate name .. . shall contain the word 'Corporation,' 'Incorporated' or 'Limited,'
or the abbreviation of any of those words . . ."; La. R.S. 12:23 is contained in Part II
of Title 12 pertaining to the filing requirements of a newly formed corporation.
6. Transport Refrigeration of La., Inc. v. D'Antoni, 281 So. 2d 469 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1973).
7. Id.
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of the following words: Corporation, Incorporated, Limited, Company,
or their abbreviations. It is unfortunate that Sweeny named the cor-
poration "Suntans Unlimited" rather than "Suntans Limited".
Important Factors and the Jurisprudence
Trade Names
Under agency law, a party claiming immunity from personal liability
has the burden of proving the existence of the agency relationship.8
Notwithstanding contracts affecting immovable interests, 9 parol evidence
has generally been admissible in attempts by agents to prove the dis-
closure of their agency status. 0 Inasmuch as the adequacy of disclosure
is a question of fact, the following cases reveal some of the factors
which may influence a court.
The use of a trade name is a common defense to allegations based
on undisclosed agency. This contention, however, has been consistently
rejected. In Transport Refrigeration of Louisiana, Inc. v. D'Antoni,"
the defendant operated several businesses, two of which dealt with the
plaintiff. In fact, the plaintiff and defendant were located at the same
address. A work order showed that repairs were made by the plaintiff
on a truck owned by one of the defendant's businesses, Deep South
Transport. Deep South owned the trucks but they were leased to another
of the defendant's companies, D'Antoni Motor Lines, Inc. When the
defendant ordered the repairs, he did not tell the plaintiff that Deep
South was a corporation. Deep South eventually went out of business.
The court held the defendant personally liable for the repair bill because
there was insufficient disclosure of the corporate status of Deep South.
Even though the defendant used the trade name, and the plaintiff was
familiar with the company, the court stated that:
[T]he mere use of a trade name is not necessarily a sufficient
disclosure by the individual that he is in fact contracting on
8. Marmedic, Inc. v. International Ship Management & Agency Serv., Inc., 425 So.
2d 878 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
9. For example, La. Civ. Code art. 2440 requires that the transfer of an immovable
be in writing. Likewise, an agency agreement used in conjunction with the transfer must
also be in writing. If an undisclosed agency issue existed, the introduction of parol evidence
may meet resistance. No cases on the subject were located.
10. See American Bank and Trust Co. of Houma v. Wetland Workover, 523 So. 2d
942, 945-46 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 282 (1988); and Marmedic, Inc.
v. Int'l Ship Management and Agency Serv., Inc., 425 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1983).
11. 281 So. 2d 469 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
1990]
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behalf of a corporation so as to protect him against personal
liability. The facts and circumstances of each case determine
whether or not the individual sufficiently disclosed that he was
acting in a representative capacity so as to alert the other con-
tracting party that the contract was with a corporation.' 2
Trade names have been treated similarly throughout Louisiana jurispru-
dence, as well as in other jurisdictions."'
Checks, Stationary, Invoices, etc.
Many situations exist where, in addition to the use of a trade name,
a defendant attempts to prove disclosure by introducing evidence in the
form of checks, stationary, invoices, etc. which on their face include a
notation of the corporate status of the business. In Wilkinson, the
defendant made lease payments with checks drawn on the account of
"Suntans Unlimited, Inc.' ' 4 The security deposit check, given to the
plaintiff several days before the execution of the lease, was likewise
drawn on the account of "Suntans Unlimited, Inc." The court, however,
discredited this evidence of disclosure by placing undue emphasis on the
addresses printed on the checks. Presumably some of the checks used
were printed prior to the lease and contained an address different from
that of the leased premises. The court commented that "[alt best, these
checks prove that for at least half of the lease term a corporation at
another location paid the monthly rent for the . . . office space leased
from plaintiff."' 5 Why this statement was relevant to the issue of dis-
closure is unclear. It is, however, evident from this language that the
court had a strong desire to discount this evidence of disclosure by
implying that a different corporation with the same name as that of
the defendant's may have been making the lease payments. Even though
the court's analysis concerning the checks is less than persuasive, the
result reached is generally consistent with prior decisions. 16
Another example of the insignificance courts attach to checks is
found in Martin Home Center, Inc. v. Stafford.7 In this decision, also
from the third circuit, a corporate agent was held personally liable for
12. Id. at 471.
13. Wynne v. Adcock Pipe and Supply, 761 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
14. Wilkinson, 532 So. 2d at 244.
15. Id. at 247.
16. See generally Eastin v. Ramey, 257 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972) (letterheads,
checks and telephone directory listing); Prevost v. Gomez, 251 So. 2d 470 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1971) (stationary invoices, bank checks and newspaper advertisements); Darr v.
Kinchen, 176 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 248 La. 386, 178 So. 2d 664
(1965) (checks); Wilson v. McNabb, 157 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) (checks).
17. 434 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
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the purchase of building supplies from the plaintiff. The defendant
introduced into evidence cancelled checks and a purchase order written
on stationary bearing the corporate name of the defendant's business,
New Creations Enterprises, Inc. The court's attitude toward the evidence
was clearly expressed when it stated:
These documents, plus the self-serving testimony of [defendant],
are the only items of evidence showing that [defendants] disclosed
their agency relationship.
We do not feel that [defendants] proved that express no-
tification was given to plaintiff of their agency relationship. Nor
do we feel that the isolated references to the corporate status
of New Creations Enterprises in the document presented give
rise to facts and circumstances which demonstrate affirmatively
that plaintiff was aware of the agency relationship. 8
Louisiana courts, as well as other state courts, often accord documentary
evidence little weight in reaching decisions.1 9
Conversely, in certain circumstances the notation on a check is a
relevant factor. In You'll See Seafoods, Inc. v. Gravois,20 the agent
being sued had purchased large quantities of seafood from the plaintiff.
The plaintiff alleged that the agent never disclosed that he was acting
for a corporation. The agent signed corporate checks to pay for the
debt, but the checks did not indicate that the purchasing company was
a corporation. This omission was specifically noted by the court, which
held the agent personally liable in its subsequent decision.
Clearly, a defendant has a difficult task in proving he gave the
plaintiff notice that the business was incorporated. This burden is even
more troublesome because of the nature of the transaction involved.
Often when contracts are formed, the parties involved do not anticipate
and provide for any problems with payment. The thought of disclosing
that the businesses involved are corporations may not even be considered.
This is especially true of small, closely-held corporations where the
owners may not even be aware that "undisclosed agency" exists. In an
ideal setting, these problems could be avoided in the planning stage of
the business by instructing agents to explicitly disclose that the business
is a corporation. But in most situations, the owners find out about the
problem when it is too late-after a suit has been filed.
18. Id. at 674.
19. Tarolli Lumber Co., Inc. v. Andreassi, 59 A.D.2d 1011, 399 N.Y.S.2d 739 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1977).
20. 520 So. 2d 461, 462 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 523 So. 2d 218 (1988).
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Objective or Subjective Standard of Review
Authority exists for the proposition that express notification of
corporate status is not required .2 The reasoning indicates that the de-
fendant can rely on "constructive notice" to prove disclosure. In the
absence of direct disclosure, one court has specifically allowed the de-
fendant to use circumstantial or "constructive notice" to prove that the
duty of disclosure was discharged. 22 Although a standard of what con-
stitutes "constructive notice" has not been defined in cases concerning
undisclosed agency issues, courts primarily use a "reasonable man"
standard, that is, what a "reasonable man should have known." 2 3 Al-
ternatively, some courts have required that the defendant show the
plaintiff had actual knowledge he was contracting with a corporate agent.
This type of standard is more subjective and requires actual instead of
constructive disclosure of the corporate status.
Objective Standard
The basic inquiry involved in the objective standard is whether a
reasonable person in the place of the plaintiff knew or should have
known that he was dealing with an agent of a corporation. The language
a court uses in rendering its decision can indicate the type of standard
applied to the evidence.
In Chartres Corp. v. Twilbeck,2 4 the court's review of documentary
evidence resulted in a decision holding the agent personally liable. In
the evaluation, the court stated that "plaintiff was not aware nor should
have been aware that [defendant] acted in any capacity other than as
an individual. ' ' 25 The "should have been aware" test is indicative of
an objective standard applied to the evidence. It can likewise be inferred
that if the defendant had proven that the plaintiff should have been
aware of the agency relationship, personal liability on the contract could
have been avoided.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 26-28 regarding J. T. Doiron v. Lundin.
22. See Robin Seafood Co., Inc. v. Duggar, 485 So. 2d 593 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1986), where the court stated that defendant presented no evidence of direct disclosure
of his corporate status so he had to depend on circumstantial evidence supporting con-
structive knowledge by plaintiff of defendant's true status.
23. Constructive notice is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 284 (5th ed. 1979) as:
"Such notice as is implied or imputed by law .... Notice with which a person is charged
by reason of the notorious nature of the thing to be noticed, as contrasted with actual
notice of such thing." See also Brown v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 452 So. 2d 685
(La. 1984), where the court speaks of "constructive notice" in the context of a tort issue
and a "should have known" type standard.
24. 305 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
25. Id. at 732.
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The problem of the sufficiency of disclosure was specifically noted
in J. T. Doiron, Inc. v. Lundin,26 where the court recognized that this
issue has been the turning point in some cases. The defendant owned
property which was appraised by the plaintiff, but the appraisal fees
were never paid. Preliminary discussions between plaintiff and defendant
took place at the defendant's corporate offices where signs indicating
the corporate status were displayed. One of the two pieces of property
being appraised was assessed in the corporate name of Tasco, Inc.
Concluding that the defendant never actually told the plaintiff he was
acting as Tasco's agent, the trial court nevertheless felt there was suf-
ficient evidence to conclude that, "plaintiff, as a businessman, knew or
should have known that defendant was an officer of Tasco, Inc., and
that the request for an appraisal was made in the name of the corporation
and not at defendant's personal instance." '27 This result was affirmed
on appeal, and the first circuit added,
Express notice of the agent's status and the principal's identity
is unnecessary if facts and circumstances surrounding the trans-
action, combined with the general knowledge that persons in
that type of business are usually acting as agents, demonstrate
affirmatively that the third person should be charged with notice
of the relationship. 28
Arguably, if an objective standard had been applied to the evidence
presented in Wilkinson, Sweeny would have been absolved from personal
liability. Reasonableness is a question of fact, and the trial judge in
Wilkinson acting as the trier of fact concluded that Sweeny should not
be held liable. On appeal, the third circuit acknowledged that the findings
of the trial court should be given great weight. 29 Nevertheless, the
appellate court in this case concluded that the trial court did not state
what law was applied and no factual determinations or conclusions were
made. 0 Presumably the appellate court was left free to determine the
facts on its own volition because of the absence of facts and the
"possibility of tainted factual conclusions" based on an assumed in-
correct determination of the legal issues.3'
The reliance by the appellate court in Wilkinson on the failure to
include "Inc." on the signature line of the lease, together with the
insignificance attached to the other evidence presented, indicates that a
26. 385 So. 2d 450 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
27. Id. at 452.
28. Id. at 453.
29. Wilkinson, 532 So. 2d at 245, citing Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So. 2d 1330
(La. 1978) and Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973).
30. Wilkinson, 532 So. 2d at 245.
31. Id.
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more subjective test was applied to the facts in Wilkinson. The appli-
cation of a subjective test creates a more difficult burden for the
defendant to prove disclosure.
Subjective Standard
The subjective standard requires that an agent give actual or express
notification to the party that he is in fact dealing with an agent. The
related issue of disclosure of corporate status involves a subjective stan-
dard where actual notice of corporate status must be given to the third
person. Compared to the objective standard, this standard creates an
almost impossible burden on the defendant absent judicial confession
or inclusion of the corporate reference on a written contract to prove
the actual knowledge of the plaintiff.
Even though many recent decisions apply an objective standard,
there are instances in cases where elements of a more subjective standard
have been applied. One such case is Three Rivers Hardwood Lumber
Co., Inc. v. Gibson,32 where the defendant was an agent purchasing
material on an open account for a corporation. When the defendant
applied for credit from the plaintiff supplier, he did not indicate that
the credit was for the corporation he represented. The representations
made to the plaintiff indicated the credit was for the defendant indi-
vidually. All the invoices were sent to defendant. The second circuit
used what appeared to be a subjective standard by stating, "[A]ctual
knowledge is necessary, and it is not sufficient that the third person
has knowledge of facts and circumstances which would, if reasonably
followed by inquiry, disclose the identity of the principal." 33 If the court
had said nothing further, it would appear that a subjective standard
had been applied. The court, however, complicated the matter by further
stating, "An express notice of agency and the identity of the principal
is not necessary, however, if the third person may be charged with
notice by reason of the attendant circumstances . . . . 4 Even though
it is not clear what standard was eventually used in this case, it is one
of the few examples in the Louisiana jurisprudence where a more sub-
jective than objective standard was applied.
Although no Louisiana decisions exist where the court has unam-
biguously applied a purely subjective standard, there are examples from
other jurisdictions where such a standard has been applied. In Anderson
v. Smith, a Texas court addressing the adequacy of an agent's alleged
32. 181 So. 607 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
33. Id. at 609.
34. Id.
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disclosure of corporate status stated that, "[k]nowledge of the real
principal is the test, and this means actual knowledge, not suspicion." 35
The court further stated:
It is not sufficient that the seller may have the means of as-
certaining the name of the principal .. . .He must have actual
knowledge. There is no hardship in the rule of liability against
agents. They always have it in their power to relieve themselves,
and when they do not, it must be presumed that they intend
to be liable.3 6
The reason for concern after Wilkinson is the direction the court may
have taken in evaluating the evidence. The importance placed on the
failure to note "Inc." on the lease, coupled with the discussion of the
sign in front of the business, leads to the conclusion that the court was
looking for actual notification as opposed to constructive notification.
The decision even referred to Sweeny's failure to show the plaintiff the
corporate charter and corporate resolution authorizing him to rent the
office space.37
Conclusion
Absent a clear message from the Louisiana Supreme Court regarding
the standard to be applied in judging the sufficiency of disclosure, it
is apparent that appellate courts can exercise their own discretion in
determining what standard to apply to the facts of the case. There is
merit to the argument that an objective standard should be applied
because in the ordinary course of business, parties to a contract should
be expected to act in a reasonable manner. Courts should likewise expect
the party with whom an agent is contracting to act in a reasonable
manner and to be cognizant of the factors involved in their transaction.
It may be unfair to penalize an agent who acts reasonably by imposing
a duty of actual disclosure when the party with whom he is contracting
should certainly have known that the agent did not intend to be per-
sonally bound in the contract.
Apart from the standard of review issue, the current state of the
law with respect to disclosure of corporate status can be summarized
in the following fashion: The party representing a corporation must
sufficiently discharge his duty of disclosure of the corporate status in
order to avoid personal liability on the contract. When the adequacy
of disclosure is disputed, the agent has the burden of proving that he
gave sufficient notice to the party with whom he was contracting. When
35. 398 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965).
36. Id.
37. Wilkinson, 532 So. 2d at 246.
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the primary evidentiary instrument, e.g. a lease or written contract, is
devoid of any express notification of agency or corporate status, the
agent may attempt to prove the disclosure by offering testimony and
other circumstantial evidence. If the court believes that the other person
knew or should have known that the agent was not acting in an individual
capacity, the agent is relieved of personal liability. While there may be
some authority to dispute the application of an objective standard to
the facts, the majority of the cases are applying an objective test to
determine if the person contracting with the agent knew of the corporate
status of the principal.
Until a clear standard of review is established in favor of an objective
test, the possibility exists for the requirement of actual disclosure. The
owner of a small, closely-held corporation would be well advised to give
express notice of the corporate status of the business. The failure to
include three letters, "Inc.", can negate any limitation in liability, which
is often the primary reason for incorporating.
John C. Geyer
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